

Higher Level Global Validity

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In this talk I will argue for global as opposed to local validity as the criterion of validity for higher level inferences (metainferences, metametainferences, and so on). This is despite the emerging consensus in favour of the local option (Barrio, Pailos, & Szmuc, 2020; Dicher & Paoli, 2019; Golan, 2021), and the resulting lack of exploration of global validity for inferences beyond than the metalevel. I demonstrate how global validity permits two natural but non-equivalent generalizations to higher levels, and furthermore generalize Teijero's (2021) proof, that basic local and global validity collapse given certain general circumstances, to show that in these conditions both global versions are at least as strong as local validity on all inferential levels. Secondly, I will offer defenses against the main objections to global validity, and observe that what I dub global-global validity has a distinct advantage over both alternatives in being extensionally characterizable. I consider the case study of multilateral logics (Incurvati & Schlöder, 2022a, 2022b) as an example of a research context in which this benefit is crucial and the criticisms turn out especially weak. I conclude that the case against global validity is at least far less clear than is commonly suggested.

References

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